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INVOLUNTARY INTERPRISON TRANSFERS
OF STATE PRISONERS AFTER MEACHUM
v. FANO AND MONTANYE v. HAYMES
In the past decade the Supreme Court of the United States has
begun to analyze and define, on a case-by-case basis, what rights
criminal defendants retain after conviction and incarceration., This
ad hoc development of what could be called an inmate bill of rights
continued in its 1975 Term as the Supreme Court addressed a new
incident of prison life-the summary transfer of prisoners between
state penal institutions. 2 Two prisoners' rights cases this term,3
Meachum v. Fano4 and Montanye v. Haymes,5 raised the issue of the
applicability of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to the
interprison transfer of state prisoners. Although its decisions of re-
cent years had gradually broadened the nature of the constitutional
interests retained by convicted persons,6 the Court in Meachum and
Montanye declared that, absent some state law or practice creating
such rights, a prisoner's protected liberty interests do not include the
right to stay where he is or the right to notice and hearing when
involuntarily transferred to another prison.7
I See section I.B. infra. For representative lower federal court decisions, see, e.g., Wash-
ington Post v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881
(N.D. Miss. 1972); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part,
503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Landman v. Royster. 333 F.
Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
2 The Supreme Court recently avoided the issue in Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395
(1975), by holding the case moot by virtue of the prisoner's transfer back to his original prison.
2 Two prisoner cases were decided before Meachum and Montanye in the 1975 Term.
Baxter v. Palmigiano, decided with Enomoto v. Clutchette, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976). These cases
involved the extent of due process procedures required in prison disciplinary hearings, to which
the Court had held the due process clause applicable in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974). Another prisoner case involving disciplinary transfers was vacated and remanded in
light of Baxter. Lash v. Aikens, 96 S. Ct. 1721 (1976). See also Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147 (1975) (due process claim based on prison parole board's failure to give hearing prior
to denial of parole opportunity held moot); Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 96 S. Ct. 2119
(1976) (prisoner mandamus action); Estelle v. Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976) (right to fair
trial implicated by inmate garbed in prison clothes at state trial).
96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
5 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
£ See section I.B. infra. See generally Note, Backwash Benefits For Second Class Citizens:
Prisoners' First Amendment And Procedural Due Process Rights, 46 U. COLo. L. REV. 377
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Backwash Benefits]; Note, Behind Closed Doors: An Empiri-
cal Inquiry into the Nature of Prison Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REV. 919 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Prison Discipline]; Case Note, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 345 (1975).
1 96 S. Ct. at 2534; 96 S. Ct. at 2547. By holding that the summary transfers did not
infringe a liberty interest protected by the due process clause, the Court obviated the decision
of whether notice and hearing procedures would be required when state corrections law or
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The decisions ended in large measure the controversy among the
lower federal courts which, having heard a multitude of prisoner
transfer cases in recent years, were divided over the issue of due
process protection for inmates subject to involuntary transfers.8 The
regulation created a right to avoid interprison transfer cognizable under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
The large body of prison transfer law developed in the lower courts involves intrastate
transfers of state prisoners, similar to those at issue in Meachum and Montanye, but includes
interstate transfers and transfers involving federal prisoners. While this Note will limit its
discussion to intrastate transfers of state prisoners, the various kinds of transfer cases are cited
below to illustrate the diverse results arrived at by the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Aikens v.
Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975), modifying inpart 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 1721 (1976) (disciplinary transfer from state reformatory to prison
requires hearing prior to transfer); Store v. Egeler, 506 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1974) (intrastate
transfer to different custody level prison implicates due process); Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493
F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974) (prisoners transferred interstate have no right to due process proce-
dures); Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209 (lst Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S.
909 (1974), on remand, 510 F.2d 537 (1974) (intrastate transfer of state prisoners to other state
and federal prisons comparable to punishments requiring procedures comporting with due
process); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972) (no constitutional right to remain in
any particular prison when prisoner transferred intrastate); Hillen v. Director, 455 F.2d 510
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) (no constitutional issue raised by transfer under
Interstate Corrections Compact); Collins v. Bordenkircher, 403 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. W. Va.
1975) (granting equitable relief after transfer although no due process rights were implicated
by summary transfer); Blair v. Finkbeiner, 402 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (intrastate
transfer between maximum security prisons raises no constitutional issue); Daigle v. Hall, 387
F. Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975) (reclassification of prisoner resulting in his disciplinary segrega-
tion within one state prison held violative of due process); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp.
338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (transfer to behavioral modification program without hearing held to
violate due process); Schumate v. New York, 373 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) (intrastate
transfer requires no due process procedures unless adverse change in level of custody involved);
Beatham v. Manson, 369 F. Supp. 783 (D. Conn. 1973) (no due process required in transfer
from a higher to lesser security institution); Ault v. Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. Ky. 1973)
(accord); Croom v. Manson, 367 F. Supp. 586 (D. Conn. 1973) (interstate transfer requires only
minimal procedures); Benfield v. Bounds, 363 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. N.C. 1973) (transfer between
state prisons entirely a matter of administrative discretion); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238
(D.N.H. 1973) (interstate transfers require full trial-type due process procedures); White v.
Gillman, 360 F. Supp. 64 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (punitive intrastate transfer from reformatory to
penitentiary requires due process protection); Capitan v. Cupp, 356 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1972)
(punitive interstate transfer requires due process procedures); United States ex rel. Neal v.
Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (administrative transfers free from constitutional
challenge but disciplinary transfers require due process procedures).
Cases involving federal prisoners have been equally inconsistent. Compare United States
ex rel. Gallagher v. Daggett, 326 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1971) (transfer to higher security
prison presents no due process issue), with Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mich.
1974) (transfer to higher security prison requires due process safeguards). The last case to
challenge the Federal Bureau of Prisons' disciplinary transfer policy, Robins v. Kleindienst. 383
F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1974), was dismissed by stipulation when the Bureau adopted a new
transfer policy requiring minimal procedures to accompany each punitive transfer. Bureau of
Prisons Policy Statement 7400.5C, Inmate Discipline (November 4, 1974), since superceded
by 7400.5D (July 7. 1975).
See generally Broude, The Use of Involuntary Inter-prison Transfer as a Sanction, 3 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 117 (1974); Millemann & Millemann, The Prisoner's Right to Stay Where He Is,
NOTE
issue apparently gave the Supreme Court little difficulty, as evidenced
by the brief opinions in Meachum and Montanye. While its due
process analysis was not wholly inconsistent with that of prior deci-
sions, the Court did not consider many factors that had been recog-
nized in earlier prisoners' rights cases." Without critical discussion the
Court rejected the reasoning of each court of appeals, both of which
had thoroughly addressed state corrections law and federal decisional
law. This Note will discuss the Supreme Court's rejection of the
appeals court decisions and the Court's own analysis of the due pro-
cess issue presented by them. It is concluded that the Court's resolu-
tion of Meachum and Montanye may signal a resumption of the
traditional "hands off" doctrine-a policy of judicial abstention from
reviewing prisoners' rights based upon the discretion allowed prison
officials in dealing with inmates.
Due to the large number of prisoners transferred between penal
institutions each year in this country,'" the holdings assuredly will
affect nearly every member of the nation's growing prison popula-
tion, and the prison administration of every state as well. Although
the full impact is difficult to foretell with certainty, prisoners' rights
litigation is most likely to be affected by the Court's broad statements
limiting the residuum of liberty retained by convicted persons. The
refusal to expand the inmate bill of rights may mean, as Justice
Stevens warned in his dissent in Meachum, that "the inmate's pro-
tected liberty interests are no greater than the State chooses to al-
low.""
I. PRISONERS AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. Development of Prisoners' Rights
While procedural due process guarantees for the defendant in the
criminal justice system have developed through the years in a number
of major Supreme Court decisions, 2 only in the last decade has the
3 CAP. U.L. REV. 223 (1974); Note, Procedural Due Process in the Involuntary Transfer of
Prisoners, 60 VA. L. REV. 333 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Procedural Due Process].
See section III. A. infra.
1, In 1970, 10,414 federal prisoners were transferred between institutions in the federal
prison system. By comparison, in that same year 89,498 state prisoners were involved in
interprison transfers. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, NAT'L PRISONER STATIS-
TICS BULL. No. 47: PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ADULT FELONS 6
(1972). In 1974, 18,641 inmates were transferred among state correctional facilities in New
York state alone. Petitioner's Brief on Merits, Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
t 96 S. Ct. at 2542.
2" See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (right to exclusion at state trial of illegally seized evidence). Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony cases); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
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Court dealt with the procedures due a criminal defendant after con-
viction and imprisonment. 3 The recognition of convicted persons'
due process rights has been a recent development for several reasons.
In the traditional view of American jurisprudence, the prisoner shed
all of his protectable interests in liberty and property by due process
of law. 4 The federal judiciary has made a slow retreat from this all-
or-nothing position, on a case-by-case basis, by holding that some
residual constitutional rights are retained by those convicted. 5 Yet
state prisoners bringing constitutional challenges to prison practices
have faced a federal judiciary reluctant to interfere with state prison
administration-long considered wholly a state concern." Because of
the sensitive separation of power issue, federal and state courts alike
(1964) (right to be free of compelled self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(right to confront adverse witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to
a speedy trial); Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at deferred sentencing
hearing after probation revocation).
"3 The rights of convicted persons are not coterminous with the rights of imprisoned
persons. Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). Convicted individuals may be currently unimprisoned, as in the case of
parolees who have been conditionally released from incarceration and probationers who may
have received probation in lieu of prison sentences. State law controls and defines these and
other levels of custody after conviction. See generally H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS
OF THE CONVICTED (1974). The major Supreme Court cases upholding constitutional rights for
convicted persons are cited and discussed in section I.B. infra.
" As the view was expressed in one state court, the convicted felon "has, as a consequence
of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all of his personal rights except those which the
law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the state." Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871). The view had relaxed somewhat some seventy years
later. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system."); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir.
1944) ("the prisoner retains all rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by
necessary implication, taken from him by law").
11 See, e.g., Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428, 431 (4th Cir. 1966): Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 643 (E.D. Va. 1971). For substantive rights recognized under the due process
clause, see Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971) (freedom of religion); Holt v. Sarver,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (right to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1969) (right to
adequate medical care); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (freedom of
speech and association).
" See Burns v, Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972):
Quick v. Thompkins, 425 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1970); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th
Cir. 1964); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964):
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951); Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950); United States ex rel. Verde v. Case, 326 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa.
1971). See generally Hirschkop & Millemann, Tlhe Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA.
L. REV. 795 (1969).
It should be noted that although the federal-state relationship is not implicated by the
claims of federal prisoners, the federal judiciary has been no less reluctant to interfere with
federal prison management. Federal-state comity simply represents an additional problem to
state prisoners in securing complete review and effective remedies for their claims.
NOTE
took a "hands off" approach to prisoners' litigation.1 7
At the federal level the historical attitude of the judiciary, that
adjudicating prisoners' rights improperly intrudes upon the interests
of prison administrations, has relaxed somewhat as the federal courts
have recognized the paramount constitutional issues involved and
their duty to protect the constitutional rights of all persons. 5 But,
with some notable exceptions, the judicial approach to fashioning
remedies has generally been a cautious one, requiring due process
procedures in piecemeal fashion and ordering few changes in prison
practices beyond those required in a specific set of circumstances."
Prison authorities appear more successful than other state officials
in raising defenses such as lack of funds or administrative burdens."0
They have succeeded in turning what otherwise might be damning
criticism of their administrative abilities-e.g., the disastrous prison
riots of the early seventies-into a further argument for vesting more
discretionary authority in the hands of prison management .2 Even
today the published opinions urge judicial restraint and warn against
strait-jacketing prison authorities. Consequently, judicial hesitancy
11 See Royal v. Clark, 447 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1971); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993
(4th Cir. 1966); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954)
("courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with ordinary
prison rules or regulations"); Holland v. Oliver, 350 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Va. 1972); United
States ex reL. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (recognizing the need
for a middle ground between no judicial action and actual judicial control over prisons):
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Vanmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1961): Sellers
v. State, 259 S.C. 564, 193 S.E.2d 513 (1972). See generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506 (1963).
" Two courts early rejecting the "hands off" policy were Fulwood v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d
171 (D.C. Cir. 1961), and Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961). More recent cases
include Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons
but to enforce constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners."); Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969) (Administrations of state prisons "are subject to federal authority
only where paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene."): Urbano v.
McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D.N.J. 1971), af'd, 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973); Brenne-
man v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 130-31 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See generally Goldfarb & Singer,
Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1970); Note, Decency and
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Decency and Fairness].
11 For innovative remedies see Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) and cases
therein cited at 340; Taylor v. Perini, 365 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg,
323 F. Supp. 93, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzer, 456 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1972); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
See Note, Decency and Fairness, supra note 18, at 845-46.
2' This is evident from the references in federal opinions to the distinct possibility of prison
riots as a result of undermined prison authority. See, e.g., Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374,
381 (Ist Cir. 1975) (Campbell, J., dissenting), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976); Haymes v. Mon-
tanye, 505 F.2d 977, 980 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976). McCray v. Sullivan, 399
F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
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to interfere with state prison control is still evidenced in the federal
decisions."
Another historically significant problem facing prisoners as liti-
gants, from the standpoint of due process doctrine, is the now discred-
ited "right-privilege" distinction. In a long line of cases the Supreme
Court held that due process guarantees apply only to deprivation of
"rights," and not to mere "privileges." 3 Traditionally, prisoners
were stripped of their rights after conviction, leaving them only the
enjoyment of privileges. Consequently, the courts dismissed prisoner
claims on the theory that the state had no constitutional duty to
protect the rightless plaintiffs by providing them due process of law.24
State prison authorities could grant and withhold prisoner privileges
on their own terms without judicial scrutiny. But now the Supreme
Court has rejected the wooden distinction between rights and privi-
leges, 2 5 and the existence of some residual constitutional rights of
prisoners is undisputed. Prisoners are thus able to attack prison con-
ditions and procedures alleged to deprive them of liberty or property
interests without due process of law.2 1
2 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) ("[Tlhe problems of prisons
in America are complex and intractable, . . . they are not readily susceptible to resolution by
decree."), Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("We are not unmindful that prison officials
must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs."); Haymes v. Montanye, 505
F.2d 977, 980 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976) ("We certainly have no intention of
unnecessarily placing prison officials in a straitjacket.") The Supreme Court's recent approach
in Procunier and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), has been described as a "tentative
toe-in-the-water." Note, Backwash Benefits, supra note 6, at 431.
On the matter of prison officials' response to judicial interference, see Kimball & Newman,
Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELINQ. I
(1968). See also Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (prison administration
pleading lack of funds in defense to prisoner action).
2 See, e.g., Barksy v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affdby an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951); Hamilton v.
Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Crenshaw v. United
States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890).
24 See, e.g., Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481,487-88 (1908) (due process clause does
not protect prisoner against deprivation of a state-granted privilege). See generally Note, Prison
Discipline. supra note 6, at 919-25 & 934-39.
21 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See also Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1442
(1968).
21 While this Note discusses only the doctrine of procedural due process in the context of
prisoners' rights, it should be recognized that somd prisoner adjudications involving procedural
rights may be characterized as enforcing substantive due process rights. See. e.g., Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The dual characterization of such cases derives from the assertion
in the case of a "procedural" right which is in effect the claim to a substantive right. The overlap
between the two due process doctrines is succinctly explained in Comment, Entitlement, EnJoy-
ment. and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89, 93-94 nn.22-29 [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Entitlement].
NOTE
Judicial response to inmate litigation challenging the constitu-
tionality of summary interprison transfers has paralleled the response
to prisoners' suits challenging other incidents of prison life. In the
past, transfer cases were almost universally dismissed, usually on the
basis that inmates had no right to choose their places of confinement
and that prison officials had the responsibility as well as the discre-
tion to locate and transfer inmates as they saw fit.2Y More recent
decisions in the lower federal courts have rejected this approach and
held instead that the due process clause guarantees inmates notice
and an opportunity for a hearing prior to, or soon after, involuntary
transfers.28 That legal about-face was no doubt influenced by the
abundant legal commentary on the issue, the consensus of which
argued for constitutional protection for involuntarily transferred pris-
oners. 29 The receptiveness of the federal courts to those arguments
was due in large measure, however, to the expanding activity of the
United States Supreme Court in the development of convicted per-
sons' and prisoners' rights, the subject to which this Note now turns.
B. Prisoners' Rights Before The Supreme Court
Initial Supreme Court decisions upholding prisoners' claims pro-
tected their rights under explicit constitutional provisions. Prisoners
Other courts have used the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment to invalidate prison conditions since it applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See. e.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d
1332 (5th Cir. 1975), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. 1975); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). But see Gomes v. Travisono, 490
F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1973) (rejecting eighth amendment challenge to summary interstate transfer
of state prisoners to other state and federal prisons). See generally Note, Decency and Fairness.
supra note 18, at 848-64.
For the application of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to prison trans-
fers, see Duncan v. Madigan, 278 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961)
(rejecting fourteenth amendment challenge to interstate transfer).
2 See, e.g., Hillen v. Director, 455 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972);
Holland v. Ciccone, 386 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1967); Lawrence v. Willingham, 373 F.2d 731 (10th
Cir. 1967); King v. Norton, 336 F. Supp. 255 (D. Conn. 1972). Transfer to an institution
offering substantially worse conditions of confinement did not change the analysis. United
States ex rel. Stuart v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1968): Lewis v. Gladden. 230 F.
Supp. 786 (D. Ore. 1964). But see Keliher v. Mitchell, 250 F. 904 (D. Mass. 1916) (invalidating
interstate transfer of youthful inmate on ground of gross abuse of discretion).
See, e.g., Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F.
Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), affd, 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973): Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp.
165 (D. Md. 1971); United States ex rel. Gallagher v. Daggett, 326 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn.
1971).
" See, e.g., Broude, supra note 8; Millemann, supra note 8; Note, Prison Discipline. supra
note 6, at 938-44; Note, Procedural Due Process. supra note 8; Case Note, 9 U. RIcH. L. Ruv.
345 (1975).
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were held to enjoy the right of access to the courts," substantial
religious freedom, 31 and the exercise of other first amendment free-
doms.32 The Supreme Court also held that prisoners are protected
from racial discrimination under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.3 3 It thus came to be understood that fewer
rights were shed at the prison door than had previously been thought,
and with that understanding came judicial recognition that fewer
restrictions on prisoners' liberty are actually necessary to meet the
objectives of the penal system. But the ability of prisoners to claim
the protection of the due process clause has not been without qualifi-
cation-prisoners' rights are still limited by restrictions imposed
upon them by the nature of the penal system.34
The application of due process to prisoners' rights began in the
1971 Term when the Supreme Court for the first time held that
prisoners could challenge certain changes in the conditions of their
confinement under the due process clause. In Haines v. Kerne 5 a
state prisoner asserted under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 a denial of
due process in prison disciplinary proceedings that led to solitary
confinement and personal injuries. The Court, in reversing the lower
court's dismissal of the prisoner's complaint for failure to allege
deprivation of federally protected rights, held that the inmate must
be given an opportunity to offer proof of his claim.
In 1972 the Court greatly expanded the scale of convicted per-
sons' protected interests in liberty in Morrissey v. Brewer.6 The
plaintiffs in Morrissey were parolees who alleged violation of due
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
3 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating prison mail censorship regula-
tions on first amendment grounds); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). See also Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (invalidating
state prison regulation establishing highly restrictive book list for prison law library). But cf.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (first amendment challenge to prohibition of newsmen's
interviews with prisoners rejected).
31 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
" See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1971); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945). Cf In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 686, 470 P.2d 640, 646, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504, 510 (1970).
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) (prisoners have right to legal assistance from inmates in same
institution, but no right to correspond with prisoners elsewhere).
- 404 U.S. 519 (1971). The use of due process by the lower courts before Haines is
reviewed in Note, Decency and Fairness, supra note 18, at 864-71.
- 408 U.S. 471 (1972). It should be noted, however, that in the same term the Court
refused to review two cases that posed eighth amendment challenges to prison conditions,
Sellars v. Beto, 409 U.S. 968, 968 (1972) (Justice Douglas, dissenting, noted the "shockingly
primitive conditions" of solitary confinement alleged by the appellants); McLamore v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (indiscriminate use of prison chain gangs).
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process rights when their paroles were revoked without notice or
hearing. The Court upheld the claim and set forth the procedural
safeguards required by the due process clause in this context.37 As
stated in the Court's opinion,
the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a
"grievous loss" on the parolee. . . . [Tihe liberty is valuable and
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3
The Court conceded that the state was not compelled to provide
prisoners the opportunity for parole, but having created that oppor-
tunity and conferred conditional liberty upon the parolees, the state
could not deprive them of that valuable liberty interest without prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard. This same rationale was used
one year later in Gagnon v. Scarpelh"9 when the Court expanded its
Morrissey holding to reach the revocation of probation.
Dealing next with the rights of imprisoned convicted persons, the
Supreme Court in its 1973 Term unanimously invalidated a set of
restrictive prison mail censorship regulations in Procunier v.
Martinez.4 That decision vindicated prisoners' first amendment
rights, but the Court relied heavily on the infringement of their corre-
3 The Court noted that parole revocation was not a part of a criminal prosecution and
therefore the full panoply of trial-type procedures did not apply. To decide what procedures
would be due the parolees, the Court used the balancing of interests technique associated with
due process adjudication and weighed the nature of the parolees' interest in conditional liberty
with the state's competing interest in protecting the citizenry and rehabilitating its inmates. 408
U.S. at 480-90. See generally Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:
Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
The Morrissey majority then detailed the minimum requirements for due process-a
preliminary informal hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to believe a parole
violation occurred and a more formal evidentiary hearing prior to a final revocation decision
to determine whether the facts warranted parole revocation. The minimum requirements of the
final hearing included written notice of the claimed parole violation, disclosure of the evidence
against the parolee, the opportunity to testify in person and to present witnesses and documen-
tary evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses in most cases, a
"neutral and detached" fact-finding panel, and a written statement relating the evidence relied
on and the reasons for the hearing body's decision. The Court declined to decide if the indigent
parolee was entitled to retained or appointed counsel. Id. at 489.
408 U.S. at 482.
31 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Gagnon Court applied the Morrissey procedures, outlined in
note 37 supra, to the revocation of probation and reached the right to counsel issue deferred in
the Morrissey opinion. The Court refused to establish a new constitutional rule requiring that
counsel be allowed at all probation hearings. It preferred a case-by-case approach and identified
the functional considerations, i.e., whether the nature of the disputed issues or the inability of
the probationer to express himself adequately would make assistance of counsel particularly
useful, to guide courts and prison officials in determining the necessity for counsel in future
cases. Id. at 787-91.
4- 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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spondents' free speech rights which the prison regulations repre-
sented. The Court's indirect approach to the inmates' rights at issue,
combined with the opinion's lengthy apologetic discourse on thejudi-
ciary's reluctant interference with prison administration, created
some concern in the legal commentary that the "hands off" approach
towards prisoners' rights had not been forgotten.4
Another important decision of the same term, Wolff v.
McDonnell, 2 was received with the same cautious optimism. In
Wolff, some but not all of the due process procedures enunciated in
Morrissey and Scarpelli13 were applied to prison disciplinary hear-
ings that might result in certain serious punishments. The decision
demonstrated the Court's willingness to sanction judicial involvement
in prison procedures, but the Court's deference to prison authorities
in requiring only minimal procedural guarantees for the inmates
made unclear the extent to which the Court was willing to intervene
in internal prison affairs."
The prisoner in Wolff alleged that the state cancelled his earned
good time credit-credit against the inmate's prison term statutorily
given for good conduct-by disciplinary actions that did not provide
adequate due process procedures. By statute the state reserved loss
of good time credits and solitary confinement as sanctions for serious
misconduct, but the only statutory provisions establishing procedures
for impositions of the sanctions merely required that the inmate be
"consulted regarding the charges of misconduct."45 The Court re-
jected the state's argument that disciplinary procedures were a matter
of state policy wholly within its administrative authority over prisons
and therefore outside the protection of the due process clause. The
Wolff Court conceded that the Constitution did not require the state
to extend good time credit to its prisoners, but since the state created
the right and recognized its deprivation as a serious sanction for
major misconduct, "the prisoner's interest has real substance and is
sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to enti-
tle him" to limited due process protection."
Although the prisoner's complaint had challenged only the pro-
cedures employed in deprivation of good time credit, the Court in
Wolff extended due process protection to the imposition of solitary
confinement as well. That sanction merited procedural safeguards
11 Seee.g., Note, Backwash Benefits, supra note 6, at 411.
4 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
" See note 37 & 39 supra.
' See Note, Backwash Benefits, supra note 6, at 411-31.
418 U.S. at 548.
' Id. at 557.
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because it represented "a major change in the conditions of confine-
ment" and was normally imposed only for serious misconduct.47 The
Court carefully limited its conclusion, however, explaining that the
due process procedures afforded these two punishments would not
necessarily be required when "lesser penalties such as the loss of
privileges" were imposed on a prisoner.48
II. DECISIONS IN Meachum AND Montanye
The foregoing progression of Supreme Court decisions expand-
ing the scope of the due process clause to cover the claims of
convicted persons-prisoners, as well as probationers and paro-
lees-led many of the lower federal courts to apply the clause to
interprison transfers. 9 These courts took what appeared to be reason-
able readings of the Supreme Court's opinions, including in particu-
lar its Wolff v. McDonnell decision, and found that summary trans-
fers adversely affected inmate "liberty" within the meaning of the due
process clause. The contrary conclusion in Meachum and Montanye
that prisoner transfers do not implicate due process protection seems
to mark a shift in the Court's approach towards adjudicating the
rights of convicted persons.
A. Meachum v. Fano
Prompted by nine serious fires during a short period at the Massa-
chusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, a medium security
prison, officials began reclassification proceedings on six inmates
believed to have been involved in this and other disorders."0 Each was
notified of the classification hearing at which the officials would
consider whether the inmate should be transferred to another institu-
tion, and was given a copy of the disciplinary charges against him.
Each inmate was present with counsel at the individual hearings, but
the classification board alone heard the testimony against the prison-
ers. Each was allowed to present evidence in his own behalf, but was
denied a transcript or summary of the testimony against him. After
review of the board's recommendations by higher prison officials, all
six inmates were ordered transferred to maximum security prisons
within the state correctional system.
I ld. at 571 n.19. But see Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538-39 (1976).
' The Court reiterated that warning in Baxter v. Palmigiano. 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1976),
but declined to consider the due process implications of such "lesser penalties."
n See note 126 infra.
The following facts are taken from the Court's opinion. 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2534-37. See
also Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374, 376-77 (lst Cir. 1975).
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The inmates commenced a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198351 alleging that transfer to a less favorable institution without
an adequate fact-finding hearing was a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.5" The prisoners sought damages, declaratory re-
lief, and an injunction setting aside the transfers. Relying upon Wolff
v. McDonnell, 5 the United States District Court for Massachusetts
found that the notice and hearing procedures employed in the trans-
fers had been constitutionally inadequate, and enjoined the transfers
until further hearings could be held. The district court ordered pro-
mulgation of procedures to be followed in future classification hear-
ings involving prisoner transfers, and directed that the procedures due
the transferred inmates of the medium security Norfolk prison should
be established by looking to the due process procedures currently
used in disciplinary hearings at Walpole, a maximum security institu-
tion targeted to receive some of the transferred inmates.54
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's due process holding and its determination of procedural re-
quirements.5 The First Circuit relied on its prior decision in Gomes
v. Travisono,6 which had held on a broad reading of Wolfe7 that the
deprivations inherent in the interstate transfer of prisoners were suffi-
cient to trigger certain minimal due process safeguards even outside
the context of official disciplinary proceedings. In Meachum the First
Circuit expanded its Gomes holding to reach the intrastate transfer
of prisoners, again relying upon a broad interpretation of Wolff. 8
The intrastate transfers at issue in Meachum-from a medium secu-
rity prison to a maximum security prison only one mile
away-represented "not a simple loss of privileges" but, as Wolff
required, "a significant modification of the overall conditions of con-
finement."59 Therefore, the inmates' interests were held to fall within
11 Civil Rights Act of 1871, § I:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in any action of law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
52 Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664 (D. Mass. 1975).
- 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
387 F. Supp. at 668-69.
Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975).
56 Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537 (Ist Cir. 1974), on remand after vacation of the First
Circuit's original decision in light of Wolff v. McDonnell.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
The nature of the First Circuit's interpretation of Wolff is discussed at text accompany-
ing note 117 infra.
51 520 F.2d at 378. The Supreme Court in Meachum appears to implicitly reject that
reading of Wolff. See text accompanying notes 120-25 infra.
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that "liberty" protected by the due process clause under the Wolff
standard.
The dissenting opinion to the First Circuit's Meachum decision
foreshadowed the United States Supreme Court's subsequent resolu-
tion.6" The dissent denied that a prisoner's interest in remaining in one
institution rather than another was a species of property or liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Massachusetts had not con-
ferred a statutory right upon inmates to be placed or remain at a
particular state prison; thus the decision in Wolff, which was based
on prisoners' rights created by state law, did not support the prison-
ers' challenge here. The dissent argued for a different analysis of the
due process issue: "[In defining a prisoner's 'liberty' interest, one
must ask not only whether a particular event may cause loss to the
prisoner but whether one in his position has any claim to what was
taken away."61 The dissent concluded that the state, not its convicted
wards, had the exclusive right to decide where within its penal system
prisoners were to be lodged.
In the Supreme Court opinion Justice White, writing for a six-
member majority, posed the threshold question to the constitutional
issue-whether the transfers infringed a liberty interest of the prison-
ers within the meaning of the due process clause. 2 Holding that it did
not, the Court rejected the reasoning of the court of appeals that "any
grievous loss" or "any change in the condition of confinement having
a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner" is sufficient to invoke
the procedural protection of the due process clause. 3 The determin-
ing factor is, as the Court has often pointed out in due process opin-
ions, "the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight.""
The Court distinguished the protection of liberty that the clause
provided "by its own force"-the prohibition of state convictions
depriving persons of liberty without full compliance with due process
of law-and the protection of liberty after conviction which is a
"statutory creation of the State. '6 5 After a valid conviction a pris-
oner's liberty interest is "sufficiently extinguished .. .to empower
' 520 F.2d at 380.
I d. at 381.
£2 96 S. Ct. at 2534. Due process adjudication involves two analytically distinct issues:
whether the right to due process is applicable; and, if that threshold question is answered
affirmatively, what procedures must be provided. Courts have not always made this distinction.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975): Comment, Entitlement. supra note 26, at
120.
a 96 S. Ct. at 2538 (emphasis in original).
" Id. See. e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
as 96 S. Ct. at 2539 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
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the State to confine him to any of its prisons.""6 Using Wolff v.
McDonnell/ 7 as an example, the Court confirmed that the due process
clause also protected liberty interests having "roots in state law."6"
Due process in Wolff required minimum procedures to insure that the
prisoners' state-created right to earn good time credits was not arbi-
trarily abrogated by summary action of the state. In the case before
it, however, Massachusetts law conferred no right upon its prisoners
to remain in a particular prison and did not condition transfers upon
misconduct or other specified events.69 The Court concluded: "The
predicate for invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment
as construed and applied in Wolff v. McDonnell is totally nonexistent
in this case. '70
The opinion then turned to the prisoners' arguments, made by
analogy to the disciplinary proceedings at issue in Wolff,7' that since
disciplinary charges initiate and influence the transfer decision, hear-
ings should be required before transfer to protect inmates from dislo-
cation based on misinformation and erroneous allegations of miscon-
duct. The Court rejected the argument, again pointing to the discre-
tion given state prison officials under Massachusetts law to transfer
prisoners "for whatever reason or for no reason at all. ' 72 Because of
that discretion under state law, the prisoners' expectation of remain-
ing in the medium security Norfolk prison was "too ephemeral and
insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections. ' 73
" 96 S. Ct. at 2538 (emphasis in original). This seems an overly broad statement in that
it presumes state prisons afford conditions of imprisonment above constitutional reproach in
all cases. Two federal courts of appeals, however, have found conditions in particular state
prisons to represent cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. See
McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. 1975):
Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
418 U.S. 539.
96 S. Ct. at 2539.
" The relevant provisions of Massachusetts law are set forth in the Court's opinion. 96 S.
Ct. at 2539 n.7.
10 96 S. Ct. at 2539.
" The Wolff facts are recounted at 418 U.S. 539, 545-53 (1974).
7 96 S. Ct. at 2540. There can be no dispute with the Court's observation-on its face
the state transfer statute conferred unqualified discretion upon prison management to transfer
the state's prisoners. But it is rather surprising that the Court did not qualify its reading of the
statute by noting that although the state may act for any number of reasons, there are some
reasons upon which the state may not rely. The state surely could not punish a person for
exercising his first amendment rights of speech and religion, for example. See O'Neil,
Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443,
444 (1966); Van Alstyne, supra note 25, at 1445-51. Indeed, a due process issue may be raised
if it can be proved that the state truly acted for "no reason at all." See text accompanying notes
124-25 infra.
Note that the Court did not address the prisoner's claim in Montanye that the state
transferred him in retaliation for his exercise of his constitutional rights under the first and sixth
amendments. See text accompanying notes 97-98 infra.
n 96 S. Ct. at 2540.
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Closing the opinion, Justice White expressed the Court's policy
considerations in limiting the scope of due process protection in this
case. To do otherwise would "place the Clause astride the day-to-day
functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues and
discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal judges." 74
The states are free to mandate pretransfer hearings as they wish,
Justice White noted, but the Court will not apply the due process
clause to impose them on the nation's prisons.
In the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, in which Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, the Court's holding was challenged
as resting on a "fundamentally incorrect" conception of liberty.
Under the majority's constitutional analysis a liberty may either
"originate in the Constitution" or have "its roots in state law. ' 76 The
dissent philosophically argued that if man were a "creature of the
State," that analysis would be proper, but since "all men were en-
dowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal inalienable
rights" creating the "basic freedom" protected by the due process
clause,7 neither the Constitution nor laws of the states "create" the
liberty protected by the clause.
The dissent traced the development of the notion that even con-
victed persons retain some constitutionally protected liberty after
conviction and incarceration. The Meachum decision, however,
reduced the analysis developed in earlier prisoners' rights cases to the
truism: "[Tihe inmate's protected liberty interests are no greater than
the State chooses to allow."78 The dissent recognized that if this alone
is the extent of a prisoner's liberty interests, then he is once again "the
slave of the state,"7 as last century's judicial opinions were wont to
describe him.
The liberty excluded by the Court in the dissent's view was "at
the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which the
Constitution may never ignore.""0 The opinion closed by indicating
that the dissenting Justices would adopt the "grievous loss" analysis
followed by the First Circuit to protect inmate liberty infringed by
summary state action.8'
11 Id. This section of the Meachum decision is discussed in the text accompanying notes
166-72 infra.
" 96 S. Ct. at 2540-43.
7, Id. at 2541 (quoting the majority opinion at 2539).
Id. at 2541.
" Id. at 2542. This Note argues below that the dissent properly summarizes the effect, if
not the intent, of the Court's decisions in Meachum and Montanye. See section III.C. infra.
, Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
" 96 S. Ct. at 2542. The dissent later added to its list of a prisoner's protected interests
"the right to pursue his limited rehabilitative goals." Id. at 2543.
" See text accompanying notes 59 & 64 supra.
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B. Montanye v. Haymes
Haymes was an inmate of the Attica Correctional Facility, a
maximum security prison in New York State. In June 1972 he was
discharged from his job as an inmate law clerk in the prison law
library. 2 On prior occasions Haymes had been warned about giving
legal assistance in violation of established prison regulations. Later
the same day prison authorities took from Haymes a letter in petition
form addressed to a district court judge, which he was circulating
among inmates for their signatures. The letter complained that the
dismissal of Haymes and others from the library had deprived the
signatories of legal assistance and access to the courts.8 The confis-
cation of Haymes' petition was based on prison rule number 21:
"Inmates are prohibited except upon approval of the warden, to assist
other inmates in the preparation of legal papers.""4 Haymes was not
disciplined after the incident, but two days later he was summarily
transferred to another maximum security prison in the New York
correctional system.
Haymes commenced a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
seeking damages for confiscation of his petition and for his allegedly
punitive transfer without notice or hearing. 5 His pro se complaint 6
alleged that his transfer was in retaliation for disobedience of the
legal assistance rule and deprived him of due process of law. The
United States District Court for the Western District of New York
granted summary judgment to defendants Montanye and Smith, At-
tica prison superintendents, holding that Haymes' legal petition was
in contravention of prison rules and that its confiscation by defen-
dants was proper.87 The district court found no due process violation
in the transfer because Haymes made no claim that the facility to
which he was transferred provided harsher or substantially different
conditions than those of the Attica prison. In its summary rejection
of the issue the court did not consider whether an interest protected
by due process was involved.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit saw error in the
The following facts are taken from the Court's opinion. 96 S. Ct. at 2544-47. See also
505 F.2d 977, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1974).
83 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), approved "jailhouse lawyers" and invalidated
a state prison regulation prohibiting them as a restriction burdening prisoners' right of access
to the courts.
505 F.2d at 978.
0 Haymes v. Montanye, No. 1972-410, (W.D. N.Y. 1973) (unreported).
U Haymes later retained counsel. His case before the Supreme Court was sponsored by
The American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project, Washington, D.C.
" Haymes v. Montanye, No. 1972-410, (W.D. N.Y. 1973) (unreported).
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district court's analysis of the due process claim and reversed.88 The
court found two genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary
judgment: (1) whether Haymes was transferred as punishment, and
(2) whether the effects of the transfer were sufficiently harsh to make
denial of a hearing a violation of due process. The court refused to
look upon the circumstances of his transfer as a "mere coinci-
dence."" It conceded that purely administrative transfers would re-
quire no due process protection, but argued that for a transfer in-
tended as punishment, "elementary fairness" demands an opportun-
ity for a hearing because "the specific facts upon which a decision to
punish are predicated can most suitably be ascertained at an impar-
tial hearing to review the evidence of the alleged misbehavior
* 1190 The court cited Wolff v. McDonnell for this proposition,
but did not treat the due process issue as being governed by the Wolff
holding.
The Second Circuit based its holding squarely on New York
statutory law.' It noted that prison regulations promulgated under
state corrections law required some form of hearing before an inmate
could be subjected to punitive sanctions for prison misconduct. A
punitive transfer imposed without the required disciplinary proce-
dures might amount to a denial of due process; therefore Haymes
must be allowed to show the causal connection between his miscon-
duct and the transfer. The court acknowledged New York's statutory
authority for transfer of inmates, but noted: "[I1t would be anoma-
lous indeed, 'both from a due process and an equal protection point
of view, if the prison authorities could accomplish by transfer a
procedure-free punishment which they could not accomplish within
their own walls.' "92
The Supreme Court decision in Montanye was again written by
Justice White for the six justices who comprised the majority in the
Meachum decision delivered earlier the same day. After reciting the
facts and summarizing the legal theory of the Second Circuit's deci-
sion, the Court held that Meachum v. Fano required its reversal. 3
The Court recognized that the Second Circuit had narrowed its
holding to require due process procedures only for transfers made for
505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 979. The Second Circuit expressed its suspicions: "[W]e are not too myopic to
notice the distinct possibility of arbitrary, misguided, or disingenuous invocation of administra-
tive justifications for transfer. . . . [Tihe individual inmate is not left unprotected against such
abuses." Id. at 980 n.4.
" Id. at 980.
" N.Y. CORREc. LAW §§ 112, 137 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
n 505 F.2d at 981 (quoting Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209, 1215 (Ist Cir. 1973)).
" 96 S. Ct. at 2547.
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punitive reasons and, unlike the First Circuit in Meachum, had not
applied due process to all disadvantageous transfers regardless of
motive. Still, the Meachum holding controlled Montanye v. Haymes
because the predicate for invoking due process procedures-"some
right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law"-was, as in
Meachum itself, wholly nonexistent.94 The due process clause "by its
own force" did not require pretransfer hearings even though the
transfer was motivated by the inmate's breach of prison rules. Like
the Massachusetts statute in Meachum, the New York corrections
law95 did not condition inmate transfer on misconduct or other spe-
cific events, but vested discretionary power in prison officials to
transfer inmates for any reason. Therefore, the Court held, Haymes
had no right or reasonable expectation to remain in any particular
prison facility which required procedural safeguards under the due
process clause."
Again Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented in Montanye.97 The basis for the dissent was, however,
limited to the majority's failure to address inmate Haymes' second
constitutional claim-that he had been punished for circulating a
petition communicating with a court and for giving legal assistance
to other inmates.9 The dissent argued that a trial was necessary on
that claim to determine if Haymes was transferred in retaliation for
exercise of his first amendment rights. Although he would agree that
the motive for Haymes' transfer was irrelevant to the due process
claim, Justice Stevens noted that the state's motive becomes critical
if, as charged, it transferred Haymes to suppress his exercise of con-
stitutional rights. The dissent said that, due to the Court's silence on
the issue, it assumed that trial may be ordered by the court of appeals
on remand.
94 Id.
11 N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 23 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The statute is set forth in the Second
Circuit's opinion, 505 F.2d at 981 n.6. The court noted that no implementing regulations had
been promulgated by state officials "governing the proper occasions for transfers" or establish-
ing procedures to be used. Id.
96 S. Ct. at 2547.
. Id. at 2548.
The Supreme Court did not have that issue squarely before it. The district court judg-
ment in Haymes v. Montanye dismissed the inmate's claim on the grounds that seizure of his
petition was proper under prison rules and implicated no constitutional provisions. See note
84 supra & accompanying text. The second circuit did not reach that issue in reversing the lower
court's dismissal. 505 F.2d at 982. As a result the state's appeal of the circuit court's judgment
was based solely upon its disposition of the transfer due process claim. Petitioner's Brief on
Certiorari, Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE Meachum AND Montanye DECISIONS
A. Restrictive Interpretation of the Due Process Clause
In concluding its due process analysis in Meachum v. Fano, the
Supreme Court defended its approach to the constitutional issue pre-
sented as consistent with that of earlier due process adjudications,
citing Goss v. Lopez," Board of Regents v. Roth,10 0 Perry v.
Sinderman,10' and Goldberg v. Kelly.0 2 As a broad statement, this is
arguably correct. Under the procedural due process doctrine applied
in those cases, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the state
had invaded a "protected interest" in liberty or property to present
a valid due process claim. 03 It would not be enough that the plaintiff
wanted something or had developed a "unilateral expectation" of
it.10 Showing a "grievous loss" in itself is not sufficient; the loss must
be to an interest properly characterized as an interest in "liberty" or
in "property" as those words are used in the due process clause.'
As reiterated in Meachum, to determine if an interest is within the
fourteenth amendment's protection the Court looks to the "nature of
the interest at stake and not to its weight."'0 6 The common thread
running through the four cases cited in Meachum and Montanye is
that the "nature" of the interest must lie in state law or practice.' 7
The plaintiffs in those cases proved, or offered to prove, the existence
of an interest created by the state, the loss of which by summary state
action was sufficiently serious to trigger the procedural protections
of due process. Accordingly, the prisoners in Meachum and
Montanye were unsuccessful in their due process claims because they
could not point to a state law or regulation that explicitly granted
them the right to remain in their respective prisons or provided for
notice and the opportunity for a hearing in connection with their
transfers.10'
" 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
I 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
'' 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
', 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
10 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164-65 (1974). See Comment, Entitlement. supra
note 26, at 92-98.
I" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
'' Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
I d. at 575-76; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
' See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603-04 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("[Wihether a particular teacher in a particular context has any right to such administrative
hearing hinges on a question of state law.")
I" As the Court explained in Monlanye, "there is no more basis in New York law for
invoking the protctions of the Due Process Clause than we found to be the case under Massa-
chusetts law in the Meachum case." 96 S. Ct. at 2547.
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The Court's legal theory, often called the "entitlement doc-
trine,"'09 was originally developed in cases seeking to establish an
interest in property."' The doctrine has received an analogous use in
prisoner litigation seeking to show a protected interest in liberty.",
In both Morrissey v. Brewer"2 and Wolff v. McDonnell,"3 for exam-
ple, the Court relied on state corrections statutes creating a prisoner
benefit which the Court perceived as conferring a degree of liberty
on the prisoners. The surprising conclusion apparently reached by the
Court in Meachum and Montanye is that state law or practice"' is
the exclusive source of prisoners' liberty interests.
Apart from the implications this conclusion has on the meaning
of conviction and the extent of the constitutional liberty removed by
conviction," 5 the Court's analysis signifies a more restrictive reading
of the due process clause and establishes a stricter standard for its
application. Only future cases will prove whether this assessment
bears true in due process cases in general or only in those cases
involving the rights of convicted persons." 6 Its validity for the latter
"0 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970); Comment, Entitlement, supra note 26.
11 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (Welfare benefits "are a matter
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
"I The Court explicitly recognized its dual use of the entitlement doctrine to show property
interests of free citizens and to show liberty interests of convicted persons in Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). Compare Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1079 (M.D.
Fla. 1973) (prisoners' rights viewed as property interests-once a privilege is granted the inmate
is entitled to it, thus constitutional protections apply), with Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971) (prisoners' rights viewed solely as interests in liberty). Nonprisoners
are not generally thought to need statutory entitlements to have constitutionally protected
liberty. See, e.g., the discussion of Justice Stevens' philosophy of the source of constitutional
"liberty" in the text accompanying notes 75-77 supra.
11 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
11 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974).
"I "State law or practice" as used hereinafter refers collectively to state corrections stat-
utes and any rules or regulations promulgated thereunder. The term "state practice" may
include as well certain unformalized practices customarily followed by its prison administrators
which have developed through time and experience. As the discussion below indicates, the
significance of these less formal prison practices to establishing inmates' rights and expectations
protected by the due process clause is unclear. See section III.A.I. infra.
115 See section III.C. infra.
I The entitlement doctrine discussed above is used by the Court in cases involving persons
within and without the criminal justice system, and its application does not appear to vary
markedly between the two. That conclusion is, of course, based on consideration of only the
few cases involving convicted persons that have reached the Supreme Court contrasted to the
much larger number of cases involving the nonconvicted. The fact that the Court often cites
the former cases within due process opinions involving the latter, and vice versa, indicates the
Court considers the same analysis is at work in both. Once the Court has determined that due
process applies and proceeds to consider what procedural incidents are due, however, the
similarity ends. The Court uses stricter standards when mandating use of a particular procedure
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group is supported, however, by a survey of the due process argu-
ments rejected by the Supreme Court in reaching its decisions in
Meachum and Montanye.
1. The First Circuit's Analysis in Meachum
In Meachum the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit under-
stood the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell to perceive a liberty
interest in the forefeiture of state-created good time credit and, in
addition, a liberty interest infringed by the "significant modification
of the overall conditions of .. .confinement.""' 7 Convinced that
prison transfer imposes serious adverse changes to the conditions of
prisoner confinement (analogous to the imposition of solitary con-
finement), the First Circuit held that such transfers affect inmate
liberty as protected by the fourteenth amendment." 8 Acknowledging
that the state was under no obligation to provide prisons of different
security levels, the court bolstered its conclusion by analogizing con-
finement in the more desirable medium security prison to the state-
created right to good time involved in Wolff. The advantageous con-
finement, once granted, could not be withdrawn by transfer to the less
desirable maximum security prison without procedural safeguards
comporting with due process."'
The Supreme Court in both Meachum and Montanye general-
ized the First Circuit's holding as extending due process to "any
grievous loss" or "any change" substantially adverse to a prisoner's
condition of confinement. 20 The Court did not explain the lower
court's error in reading Wolff v. McDonnell. It instead described
Wolff as entitling prisoners to due process protections against depri-
vation of good time credit when the state had created a liberty interest
by providing in state law a right to earn good time.'2' Surprisingly,
the Court did not acknowledge that Wolff also extended due process
protection to prisoners threatened with imposition of solitary confine-
ment by prison disciplinary proceedings. Although in Wolff the right
for convicted persons and a yet stricter standard when the procedure will be provided to those
within prison walls. With respect to procedures required, compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); compare Morrissey with Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
M 520 F.2d at 378.
"' Id. The court relied primarily on the stricter security and fewer rehabilitative programs
at the receiving institution compared to the lower security-level sending prison. It also cited
the possible adverse effects on the inmates' records, and on future parole and furlough oppor-
tunities. Id.
"' Id. at 379 n.6.
' 96 S. Ct. at 2538; 96 S. Ct. at 2547.
2 96 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
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to good time credit was made explicit by state statute, no statute there
conferred on prisoners the right to avoid solitary confinement. The
prisoner's liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement emanated
not from statutory grant, but apparently from an implicit under-
standing from prison practice that it would be imposed only as pro-
vided by the state disciplinary regulations, which predicated use of
either sanction on serious misconduct. The Wolff Court had ex-
plained that it could not "for the purposes of procedural due process
• . .distinguish between them"; thus solitary confinement, being a
major change in the conditions of confinement, was included with loss
of good time as requiring due process protection before imposition
of discipline.122
The Court's initial application of the due process clause to prison
conditions, Haines v. Kerner,'2 was not predicated upon existence
of a state-created liberty interest, and there was also support in
Morrissey v. Brewer for the proposition that an interest in liberty can
be established without having been created explicitly by statute. The
state there created the opportunity for parole but conferred no statu-
tory right for the parolee to remain on parole. Morrissey held that
the conditional liberty of parole, once granted, could not be
summarily revoked, because "Itihe parolee has relied on at least an
implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up
to the parole conditions."'' 4 Avoidance of the loss of liberty while on
parole was protected not by explicit state law but by reliance on fair,
nonarbitrary state action. The Wolff Court repeated this principle:
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government.1 1 5
Even though prisoners' reliance upon understandings or "im-
plicit promises" derived from state corrections practice supported the
existence of a liberty interest in Haines, Morrissey, and Wolff, the
Supreme Court appears to have said in Meachum and Montanye that
nothing less than an explicit state statute or regulation can create the
requisite protected liberty interest. Many lower federal courts had
relied upon that trio of due process decisions, 26 as did the First
122 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
1- 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
1 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
25 418 U.S. at 558 (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)).
12 Citing Wolff, one court stated that "a major [adverse] change in the conditions of
confinement is considered the equivalent of loss of good time, invoking the guarantees of due
process." Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975). Other cases holding that major
adverse changes in conditions of confinement invoke due process include Stone v. Egeler, 506
F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1974); Ault v. Holmes, 506 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1974), affg 369 F. Supp. 288
(W.D. Ky. 1974); Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209 (Ist Cir. 1973); Fajeriack v. McGinnis,
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Circuit in Meachum v. Fano,1zT and granted transferred inmates the
right to due process protections. In light of this it is disappointing that
the Court did not satisfactorily explain why transferred prisoners
could not rely upon their understandings of existing prison practice
that they would not be transferred absent misbehavior. The Court,
pointing to the statutes of Massachusetts and New York that vested
complete discretion in prison officials to effect transfer of state pris-
oners, declared that in light of this state-granted discretion, prisoners'
expectations to the contrary were "too ephemeral and insubstan-
tial."'h It was, however, precisely this kind of discretionary power
vested by state law or prison practice in prison administrators which
the Court held unconstitutional on due process grounds in Haines,",
Morrissey, 31 and Wolff.'31 The fundamental difference between the
discretionary power to transfer exercised in Meachum and Montanye
and the unconstitutional discretionary powers found in the earlier
prisoner cases remains unexplained, except, of course, by the hold-
ings. In Haines, Morrissey, and Wolff the Court perceived a pro-
tected liberty interest as being at stake; in Meachum and Montanye
it did not.
2. The Second Circuit's Analysis in Montanye
It is also difficult to understand why the Court summarily re-
jected the Second Circuit's reasoning in Montanye v. Haymes, which,
unlike that of the First Circuit and others, was squarely based on the
provisions of state corrections law. 3 ' The Supreme Court in
493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974); Tai v. Thompson, 387 F. Supp. 912 (D. Hawaii 1975); Collins v.
Bordenkircher, 403 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. W. Va. 1975); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338
(W.D. Mo. 1974); Walker v. Hughes, 368 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Robbins v. Klein-
dienst, 383 F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1974).
' 520 F.2d 374 (Ist Cir. 1975). rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976).
"' 96 S. Ct. at 2540. To give substantiality to the prisoners' expectations, a "state law or
practice" is needed. If the prisoners had proved that despite the discretionary transfer statute,
transfers were as a matter of prison practice effected in response to inmate misconduct, would
they have succeeded in establishing a substantial enough expectation? It seems unlikely, for the
Court has stated the following: "That an inmate's conduct . . . may often be a major factor
in the decision of prison officials to transfer him is to be expected unless it is assumed that
transfers are mindless events." Id. The Court seems to require prison practice which is itself
rooted in state law. See text accompanying notes 145-60 infra.
'2 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (summary imposition of solitary confinement as a disciplinary
measure).
"1 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole based upon negative report of parole officer without prior
hearing before parole board). See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (summary revoca-
tion of convicted's probationary status).
131 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (imposition of serious disciplinary sanctions without prior hear-
ing).
132 505 F.2d 977, 981 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976). See text accompanying
notes 91-92 supra.
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Montanye properly summarized the Second Circuit's legal theory:
"Haymes should no more be punished by a transfer having harsh
consequences than he should suffer other deprivations which under
prison rules could not be imposed without following specified proce-
dures."' The lower court's decision in Montanye was a straightfor-
ward application of "pure" procedural due process-that is, in its
most literal sense, the due process clause requires that a state follow
its own procedures rather than allowing its officials to take arbitrary
action. 3 1 If Haymes was transferred as punishment for his conduct,
state prison officials had employed a punishment, prison transfer,
that was not an allowed sanction under prison regulations.
Furthermore, the summary transfer had circumvented established
disciplinary procedures that required notice and some form of hear-
ing prior to punishment. The Second Circuit realized that the prison
officials may have labelled the disciplinary transfer an administrative
action in order to avoid the due process procedures otherwise re-
quired in prison discipline. 35 The court did not follow the "grievous
loss" analysis attributed to the First Circuit in Meachum, but it did
consider the serious adverse consequences of involuntary transfer to
support its conclusion that it was as severe as any penalty explicitly
enumerated in the state prison regulations. 31
The Supreme Court did not appear to disagree with the Second
Circuit's evaluation of the hardships produced by summary transfer,
but the Court flatly rejected the theory that interprison transfer in-
tended as punishment required use of the disciplinary procedures
established by the state prison regulations. The Court focused instead
upon the New York statute that granted prison officials the discre-
tionary power to transfer inmates, and noted that such transfers were
not conditioned upon misconduct or any other event. The Court ap-
parently recognized the possibility that an ostensibly administrative
transfer of a prisoner could in fact be undertaken as a disciplinary
"1 96 S. Ct. at 2546.
'3 Due process serves as a general prohibition against government arbitrariness. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurther, J., concurring).
"' Since the prison officials in Haymes' case asserted his violation of a prison rule, it is
unclear why they chose not to proceed against him under established disciplinary procedures.
Ironically, their choice of summary transfer gratuitously avoided a notation of disciplinary
action upon his record. That could be a benefit to Haymes except that his file now contains
instead the bare comment that his "illicit activities in the law library necessitated transfer."
Respondent's Brief on Merits at 36 n.38, Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976).
"I The Court cited the prisoner's separation from family, friends, and counsel by virtue
of the transfer and projected the possibility of its effects on parole, educational and rehabilita-
tive programs, personal belongings, and medical treatment. 505 F.2d at 981-82.
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measure, but it did not acknowledge the possible unfairness or abuse
of discretion worked by state action unrestrained by even its own
disciplinary rules and regulations. 37 The sole critical factor in the
Court's analysis was that there must be some explicit basis in state
statute or regulation for invoking the procedural protection of the due
process clause for interprison transfers.'3
Although the Supreme Court has often said that the applicability
of the due process clause no longer depends on whether state action
affects a "right" rather than a "privilege,"' 3' the dichotomy that the
Court is now emphasizing-between plaintiffs who have an explicit
state law entitlement and those with only "unilateral expecta-
tions"-bears a close resemblance to the former doctrine.'' The rea-
soning of the right-privilege distinction was that what a state could
deny altogether-i.e., a "privilege"-it could withhold on whatever
terms it chose. Meachum and Montanye rely upon a correlative
rationale that interests protected by due process are what state law
says they are.'4' If that is so, and if prison officials' discretionary
authority granted by state law is not ordinarily subject to judicial
review, then that analysis when carried to its logical end brings the
history of prisoners' rights full circle, to having few constitutionally
protected rights at all.'
B. Applying the Meachum-Montanye Due Process Standard
Meachum v. Fano and Montanye v. Haymes came to the Su-
preme Court on appeal of the issue of the state's constitutional duty
to provide notice and hearing comporting with the due process clause
prior to an interprison transfer. 43 The Court's refusal to recognize
I" The Court refused to distinguish between administrative and disciplinary transfers
even for cases in which, as in Montanye, "prison authorities transfer a prisoner to another
institution because of his breach of prison rules." 96 S. Ct. at 2547. Having conceded a prison
rule violation which may have called for use of the prison's disciplinary regulations, the Court
did not explain why those established regulations may be ignored in favor of action under the
wholly discretionary transfer statute. The Court did, however, assert that "the Due Process
Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial over-
sight." Id.
' 96 S. Ct. at 2547; 96 S. Ct. at 2539.40.
1 See cases cited note 25 supra.
110 That is, if one has an "entitlement" under state law, then one has a "right" to due
process. Given the historical development from the right-privilege distinction to the entitlement
theory, it seems safe to say that the entitlement doctrine is the more liberal interpretation of
when due process applies. It is suggested here that a stricter standard for finding a statutory
entitlement reverts the analysis back to requiring, in effect, an established "right" before due
process applies.
" See Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2542 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' See Comment, Entitlement, supra note 26, at 107-11.
3 See section II supra.
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such a duty places heavy burdens on future prisoners challenging
summary transfer and other incidents of prison life on due process
grounds. From the Court's broad holding it is clear that, to survive
the state's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the prisoner now must allege and offer to prove
some basis in state law or prison practice for an interest sufficient to
invoke the protection of due process. To contest interprison transfer
in particular, the inmate must under the Meachum-Montanye stan-
dard establish either the right to remain in a particular prison or his
expectation, justified by statutory or regulatory law, that he would
not be removed to another prison unless found guilty of misconduct.
While the Court did not elaborate on the form that such a basis in
state law or practice must take, it is evident that the Court would
require a clear and convincing showing of the prisoner's right or
expectation based on state statute or regulation."'
The Court may have placed an inordinately difficult burden on
prisoner litigants. Presumably, the inmate who can point to a state
statute or regulation providing pretransfer notice and hearing would
have the strongest defense to a motion to dismiss. His right to those
procedures would not be indefeasible, however. Using the traditional
balancing of interests approach to establish the procedures required
once the due process clause has been determined to apply, the individ-
ual's interest in avoiding the loss imposed by the state must be
weighed against the state's interest in taking summary action.'
Against the inmate's claim that he was denied his procedural rights,
the state may assert institutional interests that necessitated suspen-
sion of the mandated procedures. The exception for emergency condi-
tions, long recognized in due process cases arising outside the prison
setting,' is an especially potent argument for prison administrators
seeking to excuse their failure to provide the usual prison proce-
dures. "'47 The federal courts have allowed that, if confronted with
I See 96 S. Ct. at 2534; text accompanying notes 117-36 supra.
5 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See generally Note, Specifying the Proce-
dures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV.
L.'REv. 1510 (1975).
I See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (seizure
of yacht thought to be used for drug trafficking); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972)
(replevin procedures); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 597 (1931) (summary action in aid of tax collection).
" However, recognition of security needs within prisons does not necessitate an absolute
refusal to apply due process. Compare Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (minimal
procedures required in internal prison disciplinary hearings), with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (trial-type procedures required for parole revocation hearing outside prison
walls).
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volatile conditions endangering the health and welfare of inmates or
prison security, prison officials may act summarily when such action
is necessary to alleviate internal pressures and restore responsible
control to the institution.'
The courts do not ordinarily question the judgment of the prison
administration concerning the severity of prison conditions or the
corrective action demanded by the circumstances."' A state of whole-
sale insurrection within prison walls is not required to justify dispens-
ing with established procedures. Prison officials can cite prison condi-
tions as giving rise to fears of imminent riot or of less major disturb-
ances. Unfortunately, the foundation for their fears is peculiarly
within their knowledge and difficult for the typical inmate to chal-
lenge after the fact. 5' Given the judiciary's usual deference to the
needs of the prison system and the experience of prison managers, the
prisoner may have great difficulty proving that the state unjustifiably
withdrew the procedural protection to which the prisoner was entitled
under state law or regulation. Thus the inmate's due process claim
could be dismissed despite the existence of statutorily based proce-
dural rights upon the state's offering some justification for taking
summary action. Nothing in the Meachum or Montanye opinion
limits the state's ability to escape state-created pretransfer proce-
dures by pleading institutional interests or emergency conditions. In
restricting the source of prisoners' protected liberty interests to rules
and regulations wholly within the control of the state, the Court did
not balance that restriction, as it should have,'5' with a corresponding
limitation on state action. State action should be fundamentally fair
and free of abuse of discretion which would render prisoners' proce-
"I See, e.g., LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1975) (prison officials'
response to emergency situation curtails rights and privileges of inmates); Haymes v. Mon-
tanye, 505 F.2d 977, 980 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976) (imminent riot, overcrowd-
ing, and related health hazards may justify summary action by prison management).
"I See, e.g., Blair v. Finkbeiner, 402 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. 111. 1975) (due process
and eighth amendment claims dismissed because emergency conditions justified solitary con-
finement and summary transfer of prisoner); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind.
1974), affd, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 1721 (1976); Hoitt
v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (D.N.H. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974) (In
emergency situations "it is not within the province of the court to second-guess the judgment
of corrections officials."); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 333 F. Supp. 1352, 1353
(N.D. Ill. 1971) (accord). Indeed, prison officials' failure to rectify unsafe, overcrowded prison
conditions may violate inmates' eighth amendment protection from cruel and unusual punish-
ment. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1975), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.
Ala. 1975); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970).
11" See Broude, supra note 8, at 159-63; Millemann, supra note 8, at 235-42; Note,
Procedural Due Process, supra note 8, at 336-40.
"I' See section III.C. infra.
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dural rights little more than empty promises.1
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments raised by the prison-
ers in both Meachum and Montanye that punitive transfers effected
without following existing prison disciplinary regulations should re-
quire the same procedures that would have applied to explicitly disci-
plinary action. The Court rejected the analogy made between invol-
untary transfers and other punishments imposed by prison authority,
and instead took note that in each case transfer was made under the
state discretionary transfer statute, not under prison disciplinary reg-
ulations.5 3 Since the label attached to the action apparently has
significance, the inmate protesting transfer in the future should point
to a statute or regulation that deals specifically with interprison trans-
fer to establish his entitlement to pretransfer procedures.
To evaluate how helpful such a statute or regulation might be
to the prisoner's case, the following hypothetical is posed. Suppose
that under state law prison transfer is a sanction that may be imposed
as punishment for inmate misconduct, but neither the statute nor
accompanying prison regulations require notice or hearing prior to a
punitive transfer.'54 Arguably, an inmate transferred under the statute
could establish some basis for his right or expectation not to be
summarily transferred at the discretion of the state. Although the
state seems to have conferred something less than a right to remain
in a particular prison, could the inmate be said to have the justifiable
expectation that he would not be transferred unless proven guilty of
misconduct? It is doubtful that the inmate could succeed under the
Meachum-Montanye standard for application of due process proce-
dural protection. The hypothetical's statute and regulations on their
terms establish no right to notice of disciplinary charges or to a
hearing procedure to ascertain the facts prior to the decision to pun-
ish. Indeed, the statute would seem to operate no differently than did
the discretionary transfer statutes that precluded the inmates from
showing protected liberty interests infringed by transfer in Meachum
and Montanye.15 s
There is an alternative analysis. In Wolff v. McDonnell5' certain
"' This had been an independent motivation for applying the due process clause in earlier
Supreme Court decisions. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing in part); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). See generally Comment, Entitlement,
supra note 26.
'1 96 S. Ct. at 2540; 96 S. Ct. at 2547.
"I These are essentially the terms of the Nebraska statute and prison disciplinary regula-
tions invalidated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 545-53 (1974).
" 96 S. Ct. at 2540; 96 S. Ct. at 2547.
158 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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serious sanctions were sought to be imposed by the state under prison
regulations requiring no notice or hearing procedures. The Court
found that those sanctions implicated liberty interests protected by
due process, and required procedural safeguards prior to the imposi-
tion of the punishment. Would transfer of the inmate to another of
the state's prisons be considered to implicate fourteenth amendment
"liberty" under the statute described above? To resolve that issue one
must again resort to state law and practice. 5 7 If state law also pro-
vided for the summary transfer of inmates at the discretion of prison
administrators' or by other language dispelled the notion of an in-
mate's right to stay in a particular prison, it would be difficult to
argue the existence of a liberty interest rooted in state law. On the
other hand, the hypothesized disciplinary transfer statute operates
exactly like the statute imposing disciplinary solitary confinement
that was held an unconstitutional deprivation of due process in
Wolff."'59 It imposes punishment-interprison transfer-for miscon-
duct, but does not afford any procedures to prevent unfair or arbi-
trary state action. The conclusion that due process might not apply
under the Meachum-Montanye standard but could apply under the
analysis employed in Wolffseems inevitable. Apart from inconsistent
results, the hypothetical raises the possibility that the new due process
standard could result in no cognizable claim even when an inmate can
point to a state law restricting transfer to certain circumstances. If
the state additionally reserves the power to determine the existence
of the triggering circumstances, its discretion would appear as com-
plete as that found in the discretionary transfer statutes of Massachu-
setts and New York. 60
The Meachum and Montanye opinions may have been intended
to leave open the question of whether due process would apply to
involuntary transfers imposed by explicit in-prison disciplinary pro-
" That is the position taken by the Court in both Meachum and Montanye. See section
II supra.
1- Such dual provisions for transfer are not necessarily contradictory because it is not
uncommon for transfer provisions to be contained in state statutes that define the scope of
authority of certain prison officers. The Massachusetts statute in Meachum and the New York
law in Montanye were both examples of this type. Neither statute had accompanying regula-
tions or other statutes which further defined or conditioned the use of the transfer authority.
Some state statutes are more narrowly drawn to require, for example, judicial approval for the
transfer upon the request of prison officials. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 246.12, 246.13 (1969);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 72 (1964).
"' See 418 U.S. at 545-53.
'" Ironically, the state's silence on how and when its transfer authority will be exercised
can be as effective as an explicit reservation of decision-making power in transfer cases. See
N.Y. CORREc. LAW § 23 (McKinney Supp. 1974), cited and discussed with respect to Montanye
at note 95 supra.
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ceedings. On the other hand, their holdings may have suggested the
resolution in that case by implication. The due process clause was
held inapplicable "absent a state law or practice conditioning such
transfers on proof of serious misconduct or the occurrence of other
events";'6' under the same standard, if the state does condition the
transfer of inmates on proven misconduct, the protection of due pro-
cess should be required. That conclusion turns the inquiry to the
conditions under which the state imposes transfer, the reciprocal
question to the one posed at the outset of this discussion, Le., what
form the "basis in state law or practice" must take to establish the
inmate's right or justifiable expectation to avoid transfer. The predi-
cate for invoking due process clearly depends upon state law and
practice, but the Meachum and Montanye opinions leave in confu-
sion the features of state statutory schemes for prison regulation that
will be sufficient to establish that prerequisite to due process protec-
tion. Proving that such interests are rooted in state law has been and
will continue to be the critical problem for prisoner plaintiffs. Such
proof cannot be easy for persons whose rights are severely limited by
their confinement and whose lives are controlled by state rules and
regulations. State correction laws are promulgated to control, regu-
late, and restrict the inmate population. By design they are not likely
sources for a panoply of inmate rights and liberties. Yet under the
Meachum-Montanye standard the laws and practices of the states are
the starting points in the due process analysis to determine what
constitutionally protected interests are retained by state prisoners
after conviction.
The Court's due process analysis may be more beneficial to
prisoners' rights than is apparent on its surface, however. The new
due process standard is more definite in application and more predic-
tive in result than either the "grievous loss" analysis used by the First
Circuit in Meachum" and other lower courts or the "pure" proce-
dural theory applied by the Second Circuit in Montanye.13 Under
these standards, whether an inmate suffers a loss sufficiently grievous
to warrant due process depends largely on the perception of individ-
ual judges. While appearing more sympathetic to prisoners' plight, a
"grievous loss" standard for applying due process ultimately
establishes few firm rights for all inmates. It operates on a case-by-
case basis to provide relief for some prisoners and deny protection
to others.'" The "pure" procedural analysis of Montanye can lead to
I 96 S. Ct. at 2534.
2 See text accompanying notes 117-19 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 132-36 supra.
" Notwithstanding this inequity, some argue that the loss analysis is functionally prefera-
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unsatisfactory results as well. As used by the Second Circuit, that
standard required pretransfer procedures consistent with the motive
of prison officials in undertaking the transfer. Any transfer that
follows on the heels of a rule violation or minor reprimand may be
perceived by the prisoner as retaliation for his conduct, but proving
the causal connection between his conduct and the later transfer is
quite difficult after the inmate is transferred without explanation and
imprisoned many miles from the source of any evidence of the motive
for his transfer.15
The Supreme Court rejected these analyses, but not on the basis
that they inadequately served prisoner claims. The Court's concern
was the increased involvement of the judiciary in the administration
of state prisons that would result from applying the due process
clause under those analyses. 6 The policy rationale given in
Meachum expressed the adverse consequences of involving due pro-
cess from only the state's viewpoint. The Court did not acknowledge
the policy considerations voiced in earlier cases that prisoners, like
persons generally, should be protected from arbitrary action of gov-
ernment; "7 that governments must use a "fair process of decision
making"; 66 that society has an interest in treating inmates "with
basic fairness"; " and that fair treatment will enhance prisoner reha-
bilitation "by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.""'7 Rather, the ap-
proach of the Court resembled the traditional "hands off" attitude
towards prisoners' rights litigation. The Meachum and Montanye
decisions endorsed the unreviewed administrative discretion granted
to prison officials by state law with the Court expressing the view that
the federal courts have neither authority nor jurisdiction to act as
prison review agencies.' The Court's language even revived the
"floodgates" rationale for denying prisoners the protection of due
process-that applying the clause to one incident of prison life will
ble and better fulfills the purpose of the fourteenth amendment than the entitlement doctrine.
See, e.g., Broude, supra note 8, at 141-42 & 152-53; Comment, Entitlement, supra note 26, at
110-19.
1" The Second Circuit did not recognize the unmanageability of its motive criterion for
due process in Montanye. Under its approach the inmate who alleges a punitive intent on the
part of prison officials must be given an opportunity in court to prove that allegation and the
adverse consequences arising therefrom. The likely result of this seemingly qualified holding
would be identical (from the standpoint of requiring procedures prior to transfer) to a flat
application of due process safeguards to all involuntary transfers.
1" 96 S. Ct. at 2540.
"0 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
"7 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
"' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
11 Id.
,7' 96 S. Ct. at 2540.
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proliferate frivolous inmate challenges to all aspects of their prison
confinement. 71
C. Liberty Interests After Conviction
"Conviction" may be a term of art,173 but the meaning of con-
viction in terms of its impact upon the individual has been less suscep-
tible to discrete description. It is now firmly established that individ-
ual liberty can coexist with the legal custody that follows convic-
tion; 174 a quantum of liberty is retained by one physically confined to
a state penal institution. 75 Yet the extent of constitutional liberty
retained by the imprisoned has not been precisely defined. Our tradi-
tional understanding of conviction and imprisonment recognizes that
the state has certain power over the convicted, including the power
to determine where prisoners will be confined during their sentences.
That traditional understanding was directly challenged by the prison-
ers protesting involuntary transfer between state prisons in Meachum
v. Fano and Montanye v. Haymes. The response of the Supreme
Court to that challenge endorsed our traditional understanding:
"Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal
limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the
State to impose."' 7
The Court also particularized the meaning of conviction by set-
ting more definite limits on the application of the due process clause.
The clause "by its own force" forbids loss of liberty by conviction
without due process of law. But after conviction, due process does not
"in and of itself" apply to the initial assignment of a convict to a
particular institution or to the transfer of a prisoner from one institu-
tion to another within the state penal system, and it does not "in itself
72 To apply due process to interprison transfers "would place the Clause astride the day-
to-day functioning of state prisons. ... Id. Other cases in the 1975 Term, while not using
the explicit "floodgates" language, suggest the Supreme Court's concern for the growing size
of the federal courts' caseload. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (federal forum
and its habeas corpus jurisdiction unavailable for vindicating fourth amendment rights and
invoking exclusionary rule thereunder); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying standing
to litigate claims of alleged racially discriminatory city zoning code).
,"I Conviction in a general sense is the result of a criminal trial, the finding by the jury
or court of a verdict or the confession of the accused, which ends in a judgment that the accused
is guilty as charged. In legal parlance, however, it often denotes the final judgment itself. See
Hershey v. People ex rel. Johnson, 91 Colo. 113, 116, 12 P.2d 345, 346-47 (1932): Marino v.
Hibbard, 243 Mass. 90. 92, 137 N.E. 369, 369-70 (1922): Blaufus v. People, 69 N.Y. 107. 112-
13. 25 Am. Rep. 148, 151 (1877): Commonwealth v. Minnich, 250 Pa. 363,366-68. 95 A. 565,
567-68 (1915): Emmertson v. State Tax Comm'n, 93 Utah 219,224-25, 72 P.2d 467,470 (1937).
171 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973): Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
,' See Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974): Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1971).
'7' Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976).
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subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial over-
sight."17 7 A fortiori, those incidents of prison life not subject to exam-
ination under the due process clause are aspects of individual liberty
that have been extinguished by conviction. This recognition is a corol-
lary to the fact that prisoner suits challenging the condition of con-
finement under the due process clause necessarily require a judicial
determination of the constitutional interests in liberty or property
retained by the convicted.
Past federal decisions have determined the nature of convicted
persons' protected liberty to include aspects of traditional liberty,
e.g., interests in shortened sentences through good time credit and in
the conditional liberty enjoyed on parole and probation,' 78 as well as
a degree of institutional liberty, e.g., that affected by confinement in
solitary. 179 Institutional liberty represents, of course, a relative liberty
based on the recognition that life can vary even in prison and that
incarceration is not a monolithic experience. Prison privileges and
programs are not equally available for all prisoners. Involuntary
transfer in particular can adversely affect those aspects of prison life,
abruptly ending an inmate's participation in educational and rehabi-
litative programs and sending him to another institution with differ-
ent, perhaps fewer, programs and privileges.'80 Consequently, the
Court's decision in Meachum and Montanye that, absent explicit
state law or regulation to the contrary, interprison transfer does not
implicate inmates' protected liberty interests means that inmates
have no protectable interests in such programs unless the state con-
fers upon them a right to those benefits.
While the exclusion of these incidents of prison life follows from
the Court's broad holding that some basis in state law or practice
must exist to create a protected interest, other less obvious conse-
quences of summary transfer would seem to now fall outside the
range of inmates' protectible liberty interests as well.' Prior to trans-
' Id.; Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1976).
"' Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright,
357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992 (1974); Note, Procedural Due Process, supra note 8, at
340-45.
I Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). See Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.
1974); Note, Prison Discipline, supra note 6, at 936-39.
I" See White v. Gillman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 66 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (loss of rehabilitative
opportunities and harsher discipline); Gomes v. Travisono, 353 F. Supp. 457, 462-63 (D.R.I.
1973); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.H. 1973).
M' The far-reaching repercussions of involuntary transfers upon inmates' lives are explored
more fully in Broude, supra note 8: Millemann, supra note 8, at 228-34: Note, Procedural Due
Process. supra note 8, at 345-49; Note, Prison Discipline, supra note 6, at 938-39.
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fer many inmates are able to maintain closer personal contact with
family and friends. Even though their visits are recognized as playing
an important role in rehabilitation, transfer to a prison in another
part of the state often precludes those relationships. 12 Transfer also
separates inmates from their legal counsel, burdening their constitu-
tional rights to effective access to counsel and the judicial system.' s3
Prison transfers can have adverse effects on credit given for good time
and on future possibilities for parole. Ironically, a prisoner recently
transferred can only speculate on what the full effects of his transfer
will be in the absence of an explanatory notice and a factfinding
hearing. Similarly, an inmate's record disclosing only the bare fact
of transfer can lead prison officials to adverse conclusions about its
circumstances when making decisions in the context of parole or good
time credits.'84 In its Meachum opinion the Supreme Court insisted
that a showing of adverse effects on parole would not change its
decision because the granting of parole had not itself been determined
to implicate liberty protected by due process. 8 '
Even though the Meachum and Montanye opinions affirm that
prisoners retain rights guaranteed under explicit constitutional provi-
sions, the opinions repeatedly point to state law and regulation as the
source of the balance of prisoners' interests protected by due process
after conviction. The conclusion reached must be (as the earlier pris-
oner cases held'86) that state convictions strip the convicted of their
constitutional liberty, but (as the more recent decisions apparently
signify' 87) that the state at its option can by legislation or regulation
restore selected aspects of liberty to the benefit of its prisoners. This
theory for reestablishing the convicted's residual protected interests
finds its legal antecedent in the entitlement doctrine which the Court
developed in formulating a definition of "property" within the mean-
" 2 Keliher v. Mitchell, 250 F. 904 (D. Mass. 1916). Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) (noting positive rehabilitative effects of visits from family and friends). But see Lindsay
v. Mitchell, 455 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1972) (dismissing prisoner challenge to transfer on grounds
it deprived him of visits from his family); Hillen v. Director, 455 F.2d 410 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
"I See Gomes v. Travisono, 353 F. Supp. 457, 469-70 (D.R.I. 1973), affd, 490 F.2d 1209
(Ist Cir. 1973), on remand, 510 F.2d 537 (1974). Accord, Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238,
1248-49 (D.N.H. 1973).
"I See Haymes v. Montanye, 505 F.2d 977, 982 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2543
(1976); Gomes v. Travisono, 353 F. Supp. 457, 463-64 (D.R.I. 1973): Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F.
Supp. 1238, 1249 (D.N.H. 1973); Braxton v. Carlson, 340 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
affd, 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973).
" 96 S. Ct. at 2540 n.8.
's See section L.A. supra.
q See section I.B. supra.
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ing of the due process clause. The recognized weakness of condition-
ing due process protection upon an entitlement under state law is that
nothing in the doctrine prevents the state from setting the terms under
which such property rights exist.' 8 Under circumstances determined
to exist by the state, using any method it chooses to make that
determination, the property right fails and there is no longer a pro-
tected interest requiring the protection of due process. In view of the
fact that the fourteenth amendment was intended to place some re-
straints on unfettered state action, use of the entitlement doctrine
thus results in a disingenuous interpretation of the application of the
due process clause.
Determining prisoners' constitutional rights after conviction by
looking to state-law entitlements presents some danger. Ultimately
the state can fashion prisoner rights in any manner and upon such
terms that it chooses, and the state can condition those rights upon
circumstances that it alone determines to exist. Unless the state sees
fit to define liberties for its inmates, their interests protected by due
process will be those basic rights originating in the Constitution and
no more. Indeed, states can respond to the implicit invitation offered
by Meachum and Montanye and destroy inmate liberty interests for-
merly created by state law and prison practice through purposeful
amendment. It would not require expert draftsmen to compose statu-
tory language dispelling any suggestion that rights or protected inter-
ests were being conferred upon prisoners. Further, states can appar-
ently avoid the burdens of existing prison procedures by labelling
everything that prisons do as administrative or discretionary action.88
Thus the logic of Meachum and Montanye allows conviction to mean
subjection to the unconditioned and unreviewed discretionary will of
the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's consideration of prisoners' rights in the
context of involuntary transfers between state prisons indicates that
prison life is still recognized as implicating constitutional interests of
'u This is not to say that the Supreme Court will not question the wisdom of the state
legislative judgment on substantive issues although applying the entitlement doctrine. See
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Perry v. Sinderman. 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The entitlement doctrine
permits this result but significantly does not require judicial second-guessing of the legislative
choice. See Comment, Entitlement, supra note 26.
"I This was the explicit basis of the Second Circuit's holding in Montanye. 505 F.2d 977,
981. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, 500 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated
as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1975); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428
(4th Cir. 1966); Kessler v. Cupp, 372 F. Supp. 76 (D. Ore. 1973).
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inmates. Meachum v. Fano and Montanye v. Haymes are not exam-
ples of the sort of judicial activism undertaken by the Supreme Court
in other areas, however. Indeed, the opinions place in doubt how far
the Court is willing to go in reviewing internal prison affairs.
The Court's candid definition of the sources of prisoners' pro-
tected interests under the due process clause shows that the tentative
approach taken in earlier cases has been abandoned. The decisions
demonstrate that the Court has adopted a modified "hands off" ap-
proach: it will leave the definition of an individual's rights after con-
viction and imprisonment to the states, and will not apply the due
process clause to prisoner interests unless they either originate in the
Constitution or are created by state law or practice. The Court in
Meachum and Montanye endorsed the traditional idea that the pri-
mary control of prison systems remains with the states; but it did not
foreclose from future judicial review prisoners' claims based on depri-
vation of their constitutionally protected interests as these decisions
narrow and define them.
By specifying state law as the source of prisoners' protected
interests, the Court was able to shape a far more definitive, albeit
restrictive, standard for application of the due process clause to
prisoner claims, and at the same time avoided increased federaliza-
tion of the relationship between the state and its prisoners. The Court
may with good reason believe that federal judges are not expert in
managing penal institutions, but it is doubtful whether state prison
authorities are any more adept at determining when constitutional
interests should be protected. By leaving substantive and procedural
decision making to the judgment of prison officials, the Court allows
the states unchecked and unbalanced power over essential inmate
liberties. The clear signal given by Meachum and Montanye to those
active in prison reform is that they should now petition the state
legislatures and not the federal courts for redress of prisoner griev-
ances.
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